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Abstract According to the Butterfield–Isham proposal, to understand quan-
tum gravity we must revise the way we view the universe of mathematics. How-
ever, this paper demonstrates that the current elaborations of this programme
neglect quantum interactions. The paper then introduces the Faddeev–Mickelsson
anomaly which obstructs the renormalization of Yang–Mills theory, suggest-
ing that to theorise on many-particle systems requires a many-topos view of
mathematics itself: higher theory. As our main contribution, the topos the-
oretic framework is used to conceptualise the fact that there are principally
three different quantisation problems, the differences of which have been ig-
nored not just by topos physicists but by most philosophers of science. We
further argue that if higher theory proves out to be necessary for understand-
ing quantum gravity, its implications to philosophy will be foundational: higher
theory challenges the propositional concept of truth and thus the very meaning
of theorising in science.
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Introduction
As one of the Millennium Prize problems set by the Clay Institute, Yang–
Mills theory is amongst the most puzzling dilemmas of contemporary science.
Though it might appear as a modest concern that ‘the quantum particles have
positive masses, even though the classical waves travel at the speed of light’1,
this problem surrounds something much deeper. Not only there is a conflict
between the theories of physics at small and large scales (or interaction and
gravity). Instead, we argue, the ‘mass gap’ mirrors the very distance between
physical phenomena and their correlates in mathematical physics.
This paper contextualises this gap from the point of view of topos theory—
a still little known area of contemporary mathematics that, nevertheless, bears
broad implications to both philosophy and science. Since Aristotle, it has been
foundational to Western thinking that propositions are divided into true and
false statements. It is this very principle that is now changing: by deriving
from Paul Cohen’s [9, 10] work on the shortcomings of set theory, topos theory
applies geometric methods to the concept of truth.
This is both a radical and challenging idea, not least because the erudition
in mathematics it requires. Topos theory is based particularly on the so-called
‘categorical’ methods developed in the latter half of the twentieth century.
They are central to many fields of mathematics (e.g., the proof of the Fermat’s
last theorem), yet only limited literature in either philosophy or physics touches
them [e.g., 2, 32, 37, 48]. And even if the true contributions of topos theory
are still open to dispute, Cohen’s discovery of the incompleteness of set theory
is generally accepted as a relevant turning point in the history of formal logic.
Illustrating the pertinence of these concerns to physics, research programmes
like the Deep Beauty suggest that the entire universe of mathematics needs to
be replaced to understand quantum gravity [24]. There is a need for ‘a fun-
damentally new way of constructing theories of physics’ [14]. Andreas Do¨ring
and Chris J. Isham [13, 14, 15] themselves attempt to develop a topos ‘inside’
of which the laws of physics could be expressed. In other words, an elemen-
tary topos is often said to be a ‘universe of construction’ where mathematics
(e.g., set theory) ‘is possible’2 [30]. Topos quantum physics could thus be
viewed as a ‘reflexive’ approach to mathematical physics, allowing us to emu-
late mathematically the emergence of philosophically important concepts like
quantisation and materiality.
Yet a notable degree of ambiguity remains regarding the meaning of the
proposal Isham introduced first with Butterfield: it could stand for very dif-
ferent things depending on in what particular kind of a topos such theories
are being constructed. Do¨ring and Isham are right in that the topos in which
physical theories take place needs not be the ‘classical’ universe where the
1 For a full definition, see
http://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems/yang-mills-and-mass-gap.
2 This means that set-theoretic statements can be emulated on the level of diagrams
related to the subobject classifier Ω of that topos. These diagrams are then used to express
propositions, theories and proofs.
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Zermelo–Fraenkel axiomatic holds. But the so-called ‘elementary’ topos the-
ory that envelopes Do¨ring’s and Isham’s argument is only the first example of
an alternative universe of mathematics.
This paper argues that not just the current approaches to topos physics but
also the philosophy of physics is most often guided by what we will call the ‘first
quantisation’ problem—the one dominated by the Einstein–Bohr-debate [e.g.,
6]. Like Pickering [43] argues, it is based on different questions than the devel-
opment of field theory, that is, the second generation of quantum theories that
became dominant in the 1970’s. For instance, philosophers tend to restrict to
the ‘quantum foundations’ problem whenever discussing the relevance of cate-
gory theory to physics. Similar tendencies overshadow topos physics where no
topos-theoretically erudite accounts besides Urs Schreiber’s [46] work address
interaction and gravity at the level of their actual mathematical contents.
It is not the main task of this paper to contribute technically to these
fields. Instead, following a different philosophical schematic, we examine, in a
mathematically erudite way, the conditions of theorising on such foundations.
Two main goals follow.
First, we argue that there are three generations of quantum theory: three
kinds of empirical problems each associated with their own approaches to
mathematical reasoning. We conceptualise them by introducing a brief geneal-
ogy of some—but, given the limited space, in no way all—theories pertinent
to the three quantisation problems. They should be illustrative also to those
philosophers of science who lack previous familiarity with quantum physics
(particularly its second problem).
This leads us to another challenge, which relates to the modes of reasoning
we engage. Indeed, as the second goal, we argue that the ‘reflexive’ aspects of
topos theory provide a way to mathematically examine the structures of rea-
soning behind some of the most noble quantum philosophical dilemmas. This
is only possible by allowing topos theory to inform philosophical reasoning.
For instance, the topos perspective allows us to specify the exact relationship
of the quantisation problems and the idea that physical theory should emerge
as an ‘internal’ part of the world, that is, that there is no need to posit an
external, artificial observer.
In effect, if topos physics provides a ‘reflexive’ approach to the three gen-
erations of quantum theory—as our main argument goes—the philosophy of
physics should be organised accordingly. Most philosophers of science, how-
ever, subscribe to a very different kind of paradigm, viewing formal logic as
constitutive to philosophical argumentation. From the topos perspective, it is
precise status of these rules of logic that has changed—if they exist at all.
To summarise, after demonstrating that the current, ‘elementary’ approaches
to topos quantum physics are limited, we will ask whether the use of higher
categories help us understand something that set theory does not. In partic-
ular, where elementary topos theory emulates the structures of set-theoretic
language (considered as 0-geometric), there is a higher categorical analogue
developed by the $3 million Breakthrough Prize nominee Jacob Lurie [36], and
it emulates more complex, ‘n-geometrical’ objects instead (Table 1). What
3
Table 1 Evolution of topos theory and its connections to physics.
local theory elementary theory higher theory . . . higher theory
theory 0-topos 1-topos 2-topos ∞-topos
external objects sets sheaves stacks . . . (∞, 1)-categories
fibred categories
internal appearance set theory local theory elementary theory higher theory
description non-categorical 1-categorical 2-categorical higher categorical
classifying object true/false true ⊂ Ω full and faithful opfibration Ω∗ → Ω
an example von Neumann topos torsor BG gauge classification . . . homotopy categories
relevance to physics quantum mechanics reflexive theory field theory quantum gravity
final theory?
is particularly interesting is that a higher topos can be viewed as a com-
bination of multiple lower degree topoi, and as we will demonstrate in the
context of Faddeev-Mickelsson anomaly, this is connected to the way in which
physics approaches systems combining multiple particles. From this point of
view, mathematics is not only used to ‘describe’ physical systems but it folds
around them.
The argument comprises the following three steps. First, we argue that
the philosophy of quantum physics, together with the existing approaches to
topos quantum physics, tends to ignore the relevance of the shift to the second
quantisation problematic. Second, the paper illustrates the relevance of higher
topos theory, by deriving from its ability to conceptualise many-body systems
mathematically and by arguing that higher theoretical point of view is thus
required for understanding quantum interaction. Third, the paper argues that
topos theory allows us to address one of the most challenging philosophical
dilemmas: that quantum theory—the ‘subject’ seeking to observe quantum
phenomena—is in a reciprocal relationship with the physical reality itself. The
next section provides an overview of this argument, keeping particularly those
readers in mind who find themselves less preoccupied of working through the
mathematical contents (Sections 2–5).
1 Overview of the Argument
What separates quantum physics from classical physics relates to its concern
for the question of quantisation: it does not presuppose matter as being divided
into separate particles, nor ignore them, but, rather, it seeks to explain how
things become quantifiable. In other words, instead of starting with a system
of separate particles, quantum science starts from a dynamical system from
which individual particles emerge only in retrospect. Measures like momentum
and position can then be viewed as operators on the solutions of such a system,
that is, on the so-called wave-functions.
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We refer to this general interest of quantum science as the family of quan-
tisation problems : how quantities are presented through material phenomena.
Of course, any single, technical approach to the quantisation problem involves
an attempt to ‘renormalise’ this picture, as physicists call it, and thus re-
place ‘material phenomena’ by another set of mathematical entities. Quantum
mechanics, for example, starts with the Scrho¨dinger equation. Even if the
infinite dimensional Hilbert space then reveals itself in a finite dimensional
form—something quantifiable even to the classical intuition—this means that
quantities do not ‘emerge’ from material phenomena themselves but, instead,
from the state space that replicates the latter. The individuation of particles
is still theoretically rather than empirically informed.
Whatever the case, in the context of the first quantisation problem, Do¨ring
and Isham carefully examine the conditions under which such a quantisation
procedure could be posed even from the mathematical perspective. Under what
topos theoretic conditions does the classical interpretation become intelligible?
In particular, is the exact topos within which quantum phenomena (e.g., the
state space) should be articulated irreducible to the latter? These questions
replicate the question of emergence in a twisted way: we ask whether quantum
reality, that is, the ‘topos’ in which theory is articulated, is itself irreducible
or contingent in relation to quantum phenomena.
At least some level of contingency seems to exist, as we will discuss, be-
cause there turns out to be two different approaches to elementary topos
quantum physics: Einstein’s objectivist and Bohr’s subjectivist interpretations
can be supported by the same phenomena. Yet the scope of the emergence-
problematic is still limited in this context: there appears to emerge only a
single choice about the reality as a whole (subjectivist/objectivist views over
quantum topos), whereas many-body systems require a situated, local perspec-
tive on emergence. In result, the early approaches to topos quantum physics
are limited in that they apply only in the context of systems consisting of just
a single particle. Quantum mechanics is ‘not yet the real thing’, as Einstein’s
‘inner voice’ told him in 1926.
But how could the question of quantisation then be posed in any other,
more ‘local’ way? The new developments of physics since the 1950’s have
largely evolved around this question. The second quantisation problem, which
we will explain in more detail in Section 3, localises the idea of quantities
and invariance, that is, the asymmetry inherent to the renormalisation prob-
lem. And topos quantum physics, we argue, similarly localises the question of
mathematical invariance, although not in respect to the ‘contents’ of quantum
theory but as relative to how it is being ‘expressed’. We claim that an exhaus-
tive resolution of the mass gap -problem would entail the convergence of these
two framings of the quantisation problem.
To understand the prospects of discovering such convergences, we will first
demonstrate that quantum mechanics still assumes mathematical invariances
(like quantum states) to ‘globally’ exist. This is equivalent with the concept
of invariance or equality in elementary topos theory, where truth-values are
assumed to satisfy a global hierarchy—a world whose internal form is ‘essen-
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tially propositional’, like the one of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. This assump-
tion is implied by the two existing approaches to topos quantum physics.
Both approaches are then limited in two ways: at the level of expression, they
only employ 1-categorical means (elementary theory), which means that the
phenomena ‘internal’ to such theories can only resonate with single-particle
systems. Moreover, both approaches restrict to local topos theory. Despite
Butterfield’s and Isham’s original proposal, this means that their own concept
of mathematical invariance is still classical, and their attempt to theorise on
many-topos systems hardly results in anything groundbreaking.
Theories of quantum interaction, by contrast, localise the very idea of math-
ematical invariance (the so-called phase invariances, see Section 3). It would
be artificial to assume a measuring device to exist outside quantum reality,
but measurements are instead made through interactions with other particles,
and the ‘gauges’ are thus considered as local or situated, like Yang and Mills
[54] suggested in 1954.
Likewise, in Section 5 we will argue that topos theory provides an anal-
ogous, situated view on numbers and measurements. In particular, we will
demonstrate that there is an analogue between the notions of ‘locality’ in the
technical sense of Yang–Mills theory, and as conceptualised by topos theory.
Yang–Mills theory is, of course, only one (conformal) approach to quantum in-
teraction, but as a matter of fact categorical tools are now applied also in the
context of non-conformal field theories like string theory [47]. We will then sug-
gest that the many-body systems of physics could be viewed as being mirrored
in many-topos systems of mathematics. Quantum mechanics, by contrast, is
articulable in a non-situated way only because it assumes the independence of
the concept of measurement in the first place.
This analogue holds the key to understanding what is at stake in contem-
porary quantum science: that we need an interactive view of not only quantum
phenomena but of mathematics as well. The resulting ‘n-categorical’ framing
of physics [cf. 3] are particularly eminent because they suggest that we should
give up the very language of logical descriptions, but approach truth and re-
ality geometrically instead. In particular, this perspective challenges us to ask
whether Arthur Jaffe and Edward Witten’s3 set-theoretic framing of the ‘mass
gap’ problem is an adequate basis for understanding it.
There is also a philosophical demand for more elaborate interpretations.
Unfortunately, most philosophers of physics have little insight into the new
directions—propositional logic still dominates even the areas focusing specifi-
cally on quantum gravity [e.g., 11, 40, 38], the ‘elusive’ Higgs mechanism [49],
or string theory [cf., 4]. While empirically discovered only in 2012, this ‘elu-
3 First, ‘every excitation of the vacuum has energy at least∆’—or that the HamiltonianH
has no spectrum in the interval (0, ∆). Furthermore, despite the fact that some quark fields
might transforms non-trivially under SU(3), elementary particles should anyway submit to
such symmetries according to ‘quantum confinement’. Finally, in accordance with the ‘chiral
symmetry breaking’ the vacuum itself is invariant only under a particular subgroup of the
full symmetry group. The problem is now to prove that for a compact, simple gauge group
G a non-trivial quantum Yang–Mills theory exists on R4 and has a mass gap ∆ > 0. [29.]
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sive’ mechanism was proposed already in 1962, though first rejected by Physics
Letters as being ‘of no obvious relevance to physics’. Without it, the second
quantisation problem of many-body systems would have been only a ‘warm-up
exercise’ [49].
Nevertheless, even if the world itself is no longer overshadowed by what
Huw Price [44] metaphorises as the ‘block universe view’, mathematics itself
is anyway viewed exactly as such a logically partitioned universe—the so-
called local topos of sets. Given how paradigmatic role formal still plays in the
philosophy of science, many physicists themselves now draw from much older
intuitions, including Hegel [45, 55], Heidegger and Kant [15: 755, 800].
As a way of exemplifying this philosophical shortage, the obstruction to
the second renormalisation problem of Yang–Mills theory is traditionally pro-
nounced by the Coleman–Mandula Theorem. It states that the global sym-
metries of the so-called Poincare´-group are incompatible with local dilation
invariance [see 41]. The standard resolution is to point out a loop hole to
that theorem: it assumes the spacetime to exist before that full Lie group
symmetry is broken [e.g., 35: 60–61]. This, however, is to suggest that the
‘historical’ (breaking) is not the same as the ‘mathematical’ (symmetry), bor-
dering on similar distinctions dominating speculative realism in philosophy.
The argument falls short because the gap between the two is preconceived and
is neither theoretically nor empirically validated. Higher topos theory, we will
argue, provides another interpretation as a situated, and thus a ‘historical’
view of mathematics itself.
This study frames this possibility from the point of view of the three quan-
tisation problems of physics—quantum mechanics, field theory and loop quan-
tum gravity. It is reasonable to consider these as different approaches to the
problem of temporality which, following Kant, can be reflected by three dif-
ferent phrases: ‘success’, ‘coexistence’, and ‘permanence’. Let us next opera-
tionalise these concepts mathematically (Sections 2–5) before discussing their
implications for the nature of theorising in physics (Section 6).
2 First Quantisation—The World Internal to a Quantum
The first quantisation problem, which is the basis of classical quantum me-
chanics, can be viewed as a single particle system -based reflection of Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle. Kennard and Weyl then formulated the principle
as the inequality σxσp ≥
~
2 based on two operators: momentum and position.
One of the two could only be known on the detriment of the other. However,
some suitable combinations of quantum operators—the so-called self-adjoint
operators—still carry a determinate value: one of them is the total energy
operator H (Hamiltonian), which gives rise to the Schro¨dinger-equation
i~
∂ψ
∂t
ψ(t, x) = H(x,−i~∇)ψ(t, x). (1)
A given solution, a so-called quantum state |ψ〉, then appeared to hold qualities
similar to probabilistic density functions. This was consequentially used as a
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basis for assessing the probabilistic likelihood of discovering a given particle
in a specific domain of spacetime.
A quantum state is, of course, still only a ‘synthetic’ construct: individual
‘states’ could only collapse upon empirical observation. However, by speculat-
ing on the existence of all such states, it was possible to represent physical
operations as operators on the state space as a whole4. What is striking is the
recognition of the fact that the quantum reality is not independent of the order
in which measurements like position and momentum are recorded (referring
to the first mode of temporality).
2.1 Do¨ring’s and Isham’s Approach to ‘Daseinisation’
Do¨ring and Isham, almost a century later, address this classical interpre-
tation categorically, by the means of elementary topos theory. Instead of re-
stricting to self-adjoint operators which globally commute (and are considered
‘determinate’), they focus instead on commutative subalgebras. The determin-
ist interpretation is then possible inside but not across contexts: the order in
which operators are applied is redundant only if they come from a shared
context.
Such commutative contexts, in turn, form a lattice that gives rise to the
so-called von Neumann topos consisting of ‘sheaves’ over that lattice V (N ).
The approach is never less intriguing as Do¨ring and Isham [14] demonstrate
how mixed quantum states require the quantum topos to be extended by the
probability topos, thus using the illustrating the probabilistic interpretation as
the example of how the topos perspective can be used to address uncertainty.
However, to illustrate the true relevance of topos theory, each topos actu-
ally combines two different situations: ‘internal’ and ‘external’. The internal
situation, in Do¨ring and Isham’s elementary case, consists of a language simi-
lar to traditional quantum algebra. Yet the ‘external’ status of that language
is another, topos-theoretic problem. The classical ‘paradoxes’ of quantum me-
chanics appear to stem from the (mis)conception assuming an equivalence
between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ situations of truth (this assumption is
correct only in local topos theory).
Formally, the quantisation problematic internal to a topos can be expressed
as an arrow Σˇ → Rˇ. We could say that this is the arrow which makes the
question of ‘quantisation’ possible. In the set-theoretic topos, for instance, it
is used to grade different quantum states according to real numbers. Do¨ring
and Isham reflect it as the ‘daseinisation’ of a physical system. Indeed, the
‘daseinisation’ allows classical propositions of the form ‘Λ ∈ ∆ ⊂ R’ to be
studied as ‘things’ accessible from inside the von Neumann topos5.
4 Mathematically, quantum operators were traditionally defined as bounded operators
closed under weak operator topology resulting in a so called W ∗-algebra equipped with
a Hermitean structure that extends complex conjugation. Determinate ones, like the La-
grangian regulator, would then be self-adjoint (A∗A = 1), that is, unaffected by the ‘sub-
jective’ order in which they were applied.
5 Even if the so-called spectral presheaf Σ itself is not a locale—it does not even have
a single global element according to the Kochen–Specker theorem—Do¨ring and Isham in-
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By internalising the relationship between physical phenomena and the rule
of law, the state locale then serves as an intellectual ‘boundary object’ between
mathematics and physics (to employ a phrase typical to science and technology
studies [7]). It gives rise to a peculiar language while, at the same time, it
materialises the semantic of that language.
However, there are two restrictions to Do¨ring’s and Isham’s discovery of
such an an object. First, Do¨ring and Isham consider the universe only as a
local topos. It is not only that the concept of propositional language limits the
‘interiority’ of the phenomena, like in the broader class of elementary topoi,
but also the ‘external’ truth is limited in a way ‘local’ in respect to set theory
(the lattice V (N ) exists as a set). Topos theorists call such topoi as being
‘logically bounded’ [see 30: 150].
To Do¨ring’s and Isham’s defense, of course, the von Neumann topos is
only the first example of a quantum topos. However, there are also conceptual
reasons to assume that local theory plays a peculiar role in their thinking.
Namely, even if Do¨ring and Isham [15: 912] acknowledge that ‘quantum theory
can be viewed [. . .] in a topos other than’ S ets (where the internal axiom of
choice not necessarily applies), their discussion of ‘the category of systems’
Sys [15: 871] is reasonable only in the context of local topos theory. We could
thus say that only because they restrict to local topos theory, they can avoid
encountering the problem of many-body systems and quantum interaction,
hoping to resolve the ‘many-world’-dilemma in a way still regulated by a global
lattice of truth-values, that is, the category of all locales L oc.
As a second concern pertaining to the problem of interaction, the theory
incorporates ‘daseinisation’ only as a single, global arrow. Therefore, even if
the existential decision to restrict to local topoi was abandoned, an elementary
approach to topos quantum physics, too, would fail to incorporate the so-
called natural equivalences (i.e. ‘symmetries’) of this arrow. In effect, even if
the localic restriction of Do¨ring’s and Isham’s approach is easily overcome by
the fact that all elementary topoi are at least ‘internally’ locales, elementary
theory itself is restricted in the precise sense that this ‘internal’ truth is still
essentially propositional, and thus unsuitable to many-body situations where
spacetime kinematics itself (read, the rules of logic) might change.
2.2 Objectivism versus Subjectivism
Despite the aforementioned limitations, topos quantum physics shows how we
can theorise about the ‘interiority’ of physical phenomena in a mathematically
intelligible way. And, in fact, even if the aforementioned restrictions apply also
to an alternative, ‘covariant’6 approach to topos quantum physics [27], the
troduce a subsequent construction of a locale Σˇ associated with the closed open topology
on Σ. It materialises the ‘state locale’ internally to the von Neumann topos, resulting in a
language regulating physical phenomena relative to that object Σˇ—a body of a quantum
‘internal’ to the site.
6 The alternative approach is based on the covariant lattice of the commutative contexts
of C∗-algebra [e.g., 53].
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existence of the latter shows that there exists some level of freedom at least
at the level of the articulation of the quantum topos.
Indeed, aside some technical differences [see Corollaries 2 and 5, 53: 16, 23],
the latter approach reflects Bohr’s ‘subjectivist’ rather than Einstein’s ‘objec-
tivist’ reading of quantum states: in the contravariant approach a convention is
valid only if it applies in all contexts whereas the covariant approach validates
a proposition if it holds in at least a single context [53]. In particular, where
Do¨ring and Isham thus engage the ‘objectivist’ view ‘see[ing] the Kripke–Joyal
semantics of the topos [S etsV (N )] as a (physical) Kripke model’ [53: 51] and
suppose it to provide ‘an observer-independent, non-instrumentalist interpre-
tation’ [14: 2], the covariant approach proves that, against their belief, the
‘Bohrian’, subjectivist view is no more prone to ‘presuppos[ing] a divide be-
tween system and observer’.
In the end, the conflict comes down to what precisely is meant by the
notions of ‘localisation’ and a situation ‘internal’ to a topos. Both views, still
representing the mechanical point of view over quantum physics, assume the
truth ‘internal’ to physical systems to be commutative. Temporality is then
reduced to the concept of order and negatively articulated as something that
is not commutative or is ‘indeterminate’. By contrast, we will next illustrate
that something remains-there in the second sense of appearing; something that
makes even the direction of time, which elementary theory still represents as
a global arrow Σˇ→ Rˇ, itself contextual.
3 Second Quantisation—In Between Bodies
Elementary topos quantum physics and the first quantisation problem treat
quantum phenomena from the perspective of a single, global concept of locality.
The question of quantities is then expressed by a 1-categorical arrow Σˇ → Rˇ,
but it can only be used to describe single particle systems. By contrast, in
the context of many-particle systems we should ask about the symmetries or
conjugates that ‘remain there’: what is the map Σˇ→ Rˇ itself equivalent with?
As one possible answer, Flori [19] uses group theory to address global sym-
metries of the arrow. Her use of set-theoretic description, however, again de-
limits the nature of such symmetries. The problem is more conceptual and
relates to the way of theorising in mathematics itself: what are the coexisting
ways in which the question of quantisation (’daseinisation’) may be posed?
Indeed, Richard Feynman’s discoveries contest the global divide between
an ‘observer’ or quantification (Rˇ) and the ‘system’ (Σˇ). He ran to difficulties
while seeking to study many-particle systems propositionally, by statements
of the form ‘Λ ∈ ∆’. This fact became apparent as Feynman sought to extend
the Lagrangian approach to studying action in the context of indeterminate,
stochastic systems. Contrarily to classical mechanics, the Lagrangian energy-
regulator itself is then a stochastic process, and so are the paths taken by
individual, interacting particles.
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3.1 Set-Theoretic Approach: Quantum Field Theories
Feynman became synonymous to how controversial quantum physics was about
to become. In response to these difficulties, gauge theories and other more
advanced field theories emerged as an alternative to the so-called quantum
chromo dynamics which, in the way it was expressed at that time, sought to
extend classical quantum theory [43]. Instead of starting with individual par-
ticles or states, materiality was regarded as a ‘field’ spanning over spacetime,
and individual quanta would become identifiable only retrospectively—this
identification refers to the so-called second quantisation problem. These fields,
in turn, are subject to local symmetries, that is, the field itself should be un-
affected by the change of (also) the local coordinate system.
Quantum electro dynamics provides the easiest example to understand the
local coordinate invariance. The field symmetries in this case are ordinary cir-
cles (referring to the so-called ‘phase’ of a particle), and this simplest theory is
also compatible with general relativity. Technically, the coordinate-invariance
is directly visible from the path-integral
∣∣∣∣
∫
Dx · ei/~A
∣∣∣∣
2
/N (2)
as the norm | · | is unaffected by complex conjugation (or the circle formed
by the roots of unity in the complex plane). This theory is implicit to the
traditional Maxwell-equations.
However, Yang and Mills [54] were the first to suggest that there are also
non-commutative local symmetries like the U(1) × SU(2) symmetry of the
electro-weak interaction. Symmetries based on such non-commutative groups
turn out to result in the breaking of the local symmetry and make the the-
ory incompatible with gravity, because the so-called connection field, which
is quantised as boson (e.g., photons), is not massless unless it is ‘free’, that
is, unless there are no interactions7. In actuality, indeed, gauge bosons are
affected by gravity.
3.2 A Categorical Approach
To overcome the pitfalls of classical field theory, mathematical physicists have
suggested a categorical approach to modeling quantum interactions. These
interactions are indeed understood as diagrams—in a way not necessarily in-
compatible with those introduced by Feynman. In particular, it is believed
that interactions are too complex processes to be described non-geometrically,
by the means of propositional language.
Instead of assuming spacetime kinematics to globally exist, the state space
itself is situated or transformed through interactions. For instance, Baez and
7 Mathematically, field theory describes matter fields as cross sections of a so-called
fibre bundle E → B [5]. The connection field associated with that fibre bundle is a form
which enables the ‘derivation’ of the matter field along the bundle. The connection field in
the U(1)-invariant theory over B = R3,1, for example, is regulated by Maxwell-equations
describing the standard laws of electro dynamics.
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Lauda [3] accessibly demonstrate how monoidal categories, which are the sim-
plest examples of higher categories, can be used to problematise or ‘localise’
the direction of time (a critical issue that has bothered most post-War the-
orists [e.g., 44]). This brings us to the question of the second temporality:
coexistence of not only objects but also of the relationships between them, in-
cluding the arrows of time which are opposite to particles and their respective
anti-particles. As regards the first quantisation problem (Σˇ→ Rˇ), the direction
of time is already implied in the very form of that arrow.
We should rather think that each particle carries its own concept of space-
time, as represented by the state object, and these different concepts come
in contact though quantum interactions. This can be found analogous to how
Heidegger [25: 383] suggests that the being-there of time is ‘always bound
up with some location’, reverting Hegel’s understanding of ‘being-there’ as
a determined being (i.e. as represented by the state object). On the level of
mathematical theory, however, this idea is problematic. For if there are mul-
tiple bodies of spacetime, how can we choose one of them to begin with? To
address this crucial question, let us discuss next what mathematics itself says
about situations consisting of several bodies.
4 Coexistence as a Mathematical Problem
It is one thing to address interactions and many-body systems mathemati-
cally, and another thing for multiple mathematical descriptions of spacetime
to coexist. Yet, we argue, there seems to be something that connects these
two meanings: quantum field theory as it localises coordinate transformations,
and topos theory as it localises the very concept of locality (and spacetime).
We will begin by discussing this on the side of mathematical coexistence, in-
troducing Alexander Grothendieck’s discovery of stacks. In Section 5 we will
then discuss their relevance to theories of quantum interaction.
4.1 Coexisting Universes of Interaction
As discussed above, Yang–Mills theory describes quantum interaction and
physical coexistence as a Lagrangian system, that is, as a fibre bundle with
a smooth connection field (i.e. the gauge field). Grothendieck [23], in turn,
studied how such fibre bundles can mathematically coexist, which lead to his
discovery of higher categories. Higher categories emerged as a mathematical
response to the problem of classifying the so-called fibre spaces. This is the
same as asking how physical coexistence is mirrored in the problem of math-
ematical coexistence.
The problem of mathematical coexistence is often known as a ‘moduli prob-
lem’: could the set of all fibre bundles given over a base variety B be itself
considered as a universal fibre bundle so that all other bundles would exist
as its pull-back constructions. Translating this into the context of physics:
could there be a universal system of interactions, that is, could there be a
‘universal’ field situating all others. Philosophically, the existence of such a
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universal system serves as a contemporary version of Hugh Everett’s universal
wave-function. Otherwise, if a physical system was not universal, how could it
recognise its own particularity?
It is not clear that such universal systems must exist even mathematically,
however, which is the precise motive inspiring the shift to categorical mathe-
matics. Set-theoretically such universal systems or entities appear to exist only
under special circumstances8. Indeed, difficulties arise when the fibre bundle
is endowed with a connection field, that is, when the fibres are related to or
allowed to ‘interact’ with each other. For example, the universal bundle of con-
nected U(1)-bundles exists neither as a set or as an elementary sheaf-object,
but only as the second Deligne complex
B¯U(1) = Hom(P1(·),BU(1)), (3)
which is a ‘stack’, that is, a category fibred on groupoids. The theory of stacks
generalises ordinary sheaf theory, resulting in 2-categories and 2-topoi instead9.
The moduli problem is pivotal for understanding the meaning of stacks.
Indeed, the local symmetries described by a quantum group G may be con-
ceived as automorphisms ‘internal’ to a matter field. These automorphisms are
not explicated on the level of set-theoretic description of a given fibration, but
information about possible conjugate-symmetries (invisible on the level of a
single fibre) can only be represented in a categorical setting, which encodes a
combination of fibres in relation to each other. The symmetries, in turn, can-
not be ignored when seeking to incorporate a variety of bundles as a universal
one. Namely, each automorphism internal to a given bundle would result in a
separate point in the universal bundle, contradicting with the universality con-
dition. As a universal entity needs to encode these ‘internal’ automorphisms,
it can exist only as a classifying stack.
4.2 Higher Topoi
To understand the structure of such entities, a 2-category consisting of stacks
is similar to the 2-category of all ordinary categories (Cats). This means that
any functor between categories (1-arrow) is intelligible only up to the so-called
‘natural equivalences’: it is meaningful to identify a given category only up
to the class of similar categories [16], which is why the notion of equivalence
is said to ‘weaken’ [32: 2]. Similar structures of equivalence are taken as the
starting point in the theory of stacks. However, they form more specific class
of objects: not only a general 2-category but a 2-topos : they are similarly
categories giving rise to an ‘internal’ concept of truth, but in higher topoi this
‘internal’ truth is not propositional but ‘geometric’ instead.
In general, in a higher topos truth is a relationship rather than a part (truth
was classically interpreted as a part of all possibilities). As a consequence, even
8 For instance, for the group G being the real line R, the moduli problem is resolved by
the so-called projective space RP∞. Also, for a topological group G, the moduli exists as a
classifying 1-topos consisting of the so-called torsors.
9 In addition to the objects and arrows (as in a 1-category), a 2-category consists also of
the so-called 2-arrows that relate 1-arrows to each other.
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if it is still possible to talk about a situation ‘internal’ to such a topos, the
situation is very different: there are no statements in the sense of formal logic
but the so-called ‘n-geometric’ objects instead. In particular, we cannot think
of what is true and false as the opposites or that we could make a point about
them.
5 Gerbital Obstruction to Yang–Mills Theory
Previously we discussed how physical field symmetries prevent us from ap-
proaching interactive phenomena by just looking at what happens ‘inside’
different, separate points in spacetime. This is the easiest to understand when
spacetime itself is only a single point. Attempting to classify group-actions
over a point, Grothendieck discovered that the moduli stack BG = [•/G] is a
so-called gerbe, that is, a specific type of a stack (in which any two objects are
locally isomorphic). Its fibres are not the action-group G but the classifying
topos BG instead. In particular, because the moduli space does not exist as a
set, there is something about the structure of that group that is invisible to
the situation ‘internal’ to its set-theoretic description as a set G.
In effect, symmetries over a single point do not only tell something about
that point itself but about the limitations of representing symmetry as a
set-theoretic concept, that is, as based on a point-wise description. Follow-
ing Lawvere’s [33: 8] claim, we need a categorical, more ‘general concept’ of
group-actions. This idea, we will next see, pertains to the second quantisation
problem in physics.
5.1 Faddeev–Mickelsson Anomaly
The explicit fibre-space construction of the matter and connection fields (Sec-
tion 3) is Cartesian in the sense that the fibres on which the symmtery group
acts are perpendicular to spacetime. Quantum field theories attempt to anal-
yse quantum interactions by rearticulating them as combinations of separate
particles, that is, by configuring multiple fibre-space constructions together
as the so-called Fock-space10. This, in turn, would be a Cartesian, direct
sum of single-particle systems. However, this renormalisation procedure is ob-
structed by the so-called Faddeev–Mickelsson operator anomaly [see 18, 39],
which stands for local symmetry breaking in quantisation of massless chiral
fermions interacting with external gauge potentials. It can be described as a
gerbe as we will next illustrate following Ta¨htinen’s [51] original construction.
It is worth noting, however, that there are actually several equivalent ways to
describe the anomaly as a gerbe [26].
10 For a connection field A, the successful quantisation entails a decomposition H =
H+(A) ⊕H−(A) which gives rise to the so called Fock space
FA =
⊕
p,q
(∧p(H+(A)⊗
∧q
H¯−(A)
)
where each term stands for the fields with p particles
and q anti-particles.
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5.2 A Sketch of the Construction
To sketch out the first construction, gauge formalism operates on fibre bundles
defined over indeterminate spacetime. It is not the deterministic, four dimen-
sional one, but instead represented through the operator ∗-algebra A . If the
Hermitean ∗-structure then extends over the entire bundle (as a morphism
E× E→ A ), the group of gauge transformations can be defined as the group
of unitary transformations11. There is a certain renormalisation procedure [39]
resulting in a Fock bundle.
The anomaly then occurs when one would like to lift the action of the
gauge group G onto the Fock bundle F—a bundle that represents multi-
ple instances of spacetime, a separate one for each particle12. That lifting
is obstructed, however, by the so-called Schwinger obstruction term13. This
obstruction—the Faddeev–Mickelsson anomaly—is representable by a gerbe
class ω ∈ H2([A/G], S1), where [A/G] is the quotient stack [see 51: 1084; 52:
42].
To translate, it is the ambiguous ‘vacuum level’ λ, indeed, that appears to
prevent a field-theoretic resolution of local gauge symmetry. There is no single
Fock space but an entire bundle of such many-particle constructs, each fibre
corresponding to a different energy level. The transformations between these
‘vacuum levels’ obstruct the lifting of local symmetry to the Fock bundle14.
To summarise our previous discussion, the obstruction to Yang–Mills the-
ory, which is described as a gerbe rather than as a field, seems to require
11 Formally, the gauge transformations form the group G (E) = {u ∈ EndA (E) | uu
∗ =
u∗u = 1}.
12 In technical terms, one would like it to induce a commutative diagram
F
ΓA(g)
//

F

A
g
// A
for which ΓA(g)DˆAΓ
−1
A (g) = DˆAg , where DˆA is the second quantised Dirac operator. The
existence of such lifting would require ΓA(e
iX) = eiΓA(X) for all X ∈ Lie(G) but instead
when one moves to the second quantisation, a so called Schwinger term—aMap(A,R)-valued
Lie algebra cocycle of Lie(G)—occurs.
13 According to Gauss law generators acting on functions ϕ : A → H , there is a de-
composition GA(X) = X + LX with a Lie derivative LX for A ∈ A and X ∈ Lie(G)
and then dΓ (GA(X)) = dΓA(X) + LX . This induces an incompatibility with the Lie
bracket: [dΓ (GA(X)), dΓ (GA(Y ))] = dΓ ([GA(X), GA(Y )])+c(X, Y ;A) where c(X,Y ;A) is
the Schwinger obstruction term.
14 For two vacuum levels λ and µ, given the local neighborhood
Uλµ = {A ∈ A | λ, µ /∈ Spec (DA)} ⊂ A, (4)
with DA being the Dirac operator, there exists a line bundle Detλµ and these local bundles
give rise to a bundle gerbe over A which descends to the moduli space A/Ge of equivariant
bundles—an entity known to be a smooth, infinite dimensional Fre´chet manifold. [42].
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physics to reconsider the kind of a ‘topos’ in which physical theory should be
expressed: in contrast to sets or sheaves, gerbes occupy a 2-topos instead of 0-
or 1-topoi. Each kind of a ‘topos’, in turn, implies its own concept of ‘local-
ity’, that is, of the structure of topological operations which is not necessarily
classical. Therefore, we cannot just say that phenomena are ‘non-local’, as im-
plied by those scholars who assume set theory and logic as the proper place
of articulating physical theory [e.g., 28, 38], but instead the very concept of
locality is ambiguous.
6 Two Ways for Theorising to End
The topos physics perspective suggests us to ask what a ‘final theory’—a ‘clo-
sure’ of physics like Leibniz would say—could possibly mean. Given how topos
theories themselves proliferate (Table 1), the problem of a final theory itself
emerges in ever more complex ways. What is common to all topos perspec-
tives, however, is the fact that this question can be studied in two contrary
ways: the possibility of a closure as a part of that topos itself (internal15) and
as we speculate on the existence of that topos (external).
The first, internal closure is relevant from the point of view of physical sys-
tems themselves. How could a physical system result in a conclusive description
of itself (assuming that any descriptions made by physicists are, indeed, part
of the material reality)? In particular, could we say something definite about
the kind of phenomena that could be representable even in principle? On the
‘existential’ side, by contrast, we are interested in the existence of that topos
that could serve as an adequate correlate of physical reality.
6.1 The Internal Side: What do Quantum Groups Enable?
On the level of the contents of quantum theory, the question is essentially
about how physical phenomena could result in something reasonable at all.
The nature could represent virtually anything (e.g., virtual particles), but we
are interested in those representations that can be recognised as its parts and
thus be conceived as consequential even in principle. Geometric representation
theory can be viewed as a field studying this question: under what mathe-
matical conditions may local symmetries result in something representable at
all.
Starting with the most obvious case, the circle, the Pontrijagin duality
states that all commutative locally compact groups are recoverable from the
corresponding dual groups consisting of their circular characters (continuous
homomorphisms χ : G→ U(1)). The circle itself exists as a dual to the group
of whole numbers, and thus illustrates the simplest way for physics to support
the question of quantifiability.
The Tannaka–Krein duality extends this duality to compact but non-
commutative topological groups, which are recovered by the category of repre-
15 This ‘internal’ geometry, however, is not logical except in the case of elementary theory.
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sentations RepC(G). This category is commutative and thus well understood,
even if G itself is not. However, when non-commutative groups coexist, the
resulting representation categories are also categorically non-commutative,
braided structures16. This concerns the direction of time, for example, as
fermions appear to ‘borrow’ energy from the corresponding anti-particles that
move in the opposite direction of time.
For rigid monoidal categories with both a quantum trace and co-quantum
trace, there is, however, the Drinfel’d–Jimbo-duality. Ordinary quantum groups
like SU(2) and SU(3) satisfy these conditions, thus actualising the possibility
that interactions, too, turn representable [see 12]. The geometric Langland’s
program now continues this quest for a functorial theory of automorphisms,
and it has recently been brought in contact with field theory [20].
6.2 The Existential Side: How are Conditions Possible?
As illustrated above, quantum groups emerge as such forms that, if anything,
can result in something reasonable. Yet they only make physics possible: they
are forms that can actualise something reasonable, and are thus free to become
represented in different positions. But these forms themselves are unable to
necessitate the exact topos behind spacetime.
Indeed, if higher theory mirrors many-body systems in the way that the
theory itself combines multiple topoi, by assuming that theory itself to exist
in a single (higher) topos brings us back to the dilemma of the single-many-
world problematic, even if the contents of this problem are no longer logical:
there is a ‘minimality’ condition, a global measure, that appears to form the
crux of quantum gravity [22]. In the context of this paper, this problem is
illustrated by the ambiguous choice of the vacuum level: as discussed above,
the vacuum level is, indeed, a global measure, but it cannot be localised in a
fashion similar to field theory because the corresponding dilation group R+ is
not compact: there is no representation-theoretic duality analogous to those
discussed above. In particular, there are currently no known ways of combining
non-compact and non-commutative theories.
Topos quantum physics provides a conceptual perspective to this problem,
addressing the possibility of a closure on the ‘global’, existential side. The
rather ‘Kantian’ question of what permits the emergence of representations is
coupled by the question of the conditions under which representation theory
itself is possible.
Do¨ring’s and Isham’s project is pioneering in this direction, even if their
decision to restrict to local theory leaves them short handed (e.g., their dis-
cussion of the category of systems as a basis for many-world interpretations).
However, Butterfield, Do¨ring and Isham believe that this track could help us
reformulate theories like the loop quantum gravity (LQG), which they believe
to be the most promising theory of gravity. The LQG extends Roger Penrose’s
16 A braided structure is a bicategorical relation γf,g : f ⊗ g → g ⊗ f which satisfies the
so called hexagon axiom of associativity, but not the commutativity constraint.
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[42] original work on spin networks17 by rearticulating the mass gap problem
as a minimal area problem of space-time.
By ‘quantising’ the spacetime itself instead of only particles and interac-
tions, loop quantum gravity could be viewed as a response to a ‘third’ quantisa-
tion problem. What makes the ‘mass gap’ puzzling is the problem of combining
these different quantisation problems into a single mathematical theory. In the
light of both the Faddeev–Mickelsson anomaly and the 4-geometric contents
of the LQG, it appears that higher categorical methods are needed, and topos
quantum physics should reorient its questions accordingly. Indeed, over the
past two decades higher geometry has surfaced in physicists’ own discourses—
especially after Seiberg and Witten [47] suggested the geometry of spacetime
itself to be non-commutative, applying Alain Connes’ ideas.
Of course, it is a possibility that higher geometric thinking could prove
out to be redundant. For example, the LQG could prove the extra dimensions
assumed by Yang–Mills theory dispensable, enabling Wilson loops to be used
as the basis for nonperturbative quantisation of gravity. However, it would
be difficult to prove that the topos within which such a cancellation are ex-
pressed is necessarily the classical one. And other than Thomas Thiemann’s
[50] Phoenix project, there is little insight into how that combination should
elucidate itself even in principle [but see 1].
7 Results and Discussion
Quantum physics can be said to have reverted the classical question of physics:
instead of explaining physical phenomena based on a pre-existing quantitative
framework (particles), it asks how those quantities (and quantifiability) emerge
as a result of nature itself. In this paper we have demonstrated that topos
quantum physics, once again, reverts this picture. It poses the question where
precisely, that is, in which exact topos the quantisation thematic itself may
intelligibly exist. One crucial open question then is to what extent physical
phenomena allow contingency in regard to the choice of that topos.
This paper has sought to illustrate the relevance of this question in the
context of the three quantisation problems of physics. As the main result of
this paper, it appears that the different quantisation problems are associated
with different kinds of topoi. As a coarse framework we suggested that it would
be helpful to associate (1) quantum mechanics with elementary theory, (2)
field theory with the bicategorical constructs, and (3) the ‘third’ quantisation
of spacetime itself (e.g., LQG) with higher theory, as indicated in Table 1.
At the same time, the question of what makes a theory ‘final’ is one of
the fundamental problems of physics, mirroring Peter Galison’s [21] question
of How Experiments End? but in the context physical theorising. We argued
17 Spin networks are 1-complexes representing the minimal length problem topologically;
these networks then represent the ‘quantum states’ of space time itself (’expression’) rather
than of individual particles (’contents’). The covariant LQG extends extends them to 2-
complexes.
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the question of what makes a theory ‘final’ should cohere with the notion of
finality internal to its topos. For example, in an elementary topos the concept
of finality still plays out as the ‘terminal object’, 1, which then regulates the
partitioning of all other objects as a kind of a ‘block universe view’ internal
to mathematics [cf. 44]. Truth, there, is still defined naturalistically as an
‘incorporeal’ relationship: as one contained in the set of all possibilities [cf. 8].
In a higher topos, by contrast, there is no such a global yardstick. We
can surely define truth or finality as a so-called ‘universal full and faithful
(op)fibration’ [36], but this relationship is not understandable as an incorporeal
property of a single object. In particular, because truth is a relationship and
not a subobject, it does not provide a global hierarchy of truth-values18 that
would give rise to an ‘internal’ logic or quantum algebra like in the case of
single-particle systems.
7.1 Conclusions
We first followed Wolters’ [53] comparison of the two elementary approaches
to the first quantisation problem, illustrating the connotations between the
classical debate (subjectivist and objectivist interpretations) and elementary
theory. Second, we discussed anomalies related to theories of gravity and in-
teraction. We then concluded that the possibility of resolving the problem of
a final theory in the classical sense of propositional logic would require the
higher geometries associated with interaction and loop quantum gravity to
be cancelled out. By contrast, if higher theory is necessary for understand-
ing physical reality, its implications to philosophy are foundational. Not only
would physical phenomena be ‘nonlocal’, like most quantum philosophers now
argue (e.g., Holman, 2014), but there would not even exist a global concept of
locality.
We do not argue that science necessarily ‘advances’ in the direction in-
dicated in Table 1 [cf. 31], however, as the concept of higher theory is itself
ambiguous [cf. 34]. Nevertheless, we can contest the view that physical real-
ity makes mathematics as such ‘fail’ (cf. Lisi and Weatherall, 2010). Rather,
mathematics itself is a temporal, evolving process [cf. 32], and given how Yuri
Manin (personal communication) reflects higher theory as ‘post-modern’ math-
ematics, Sokal’s mischievous proposal for a postmodern geometry of quantum
gravity is rather ironic.
18 For an object to be ‘contained’ in another one is considered as being a unique, unam-
biguous relationship—an ‘incorporeal’ property of the object Ω itself. Such an inclusion-
relationship can be viewed as a special case of the more general definition of the arrow ‘true’
as a fibration. What makes the incorporeal definition of an elementary topos specific is that
objects in it form a global hierarchy, while those in a higher category do not.
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